Seattle Seahawks


The competitors are Denver and Seattle, and as stated previously, my model favors Seattle substantially.

Super Bowl
NFC Champion AFC Champion Score Diff Win Prob Est. Point Spread
Seattle Seahawks Denver Broncos 1.041 0.739 7.7

 

Of course by this point my model has been reduced to a single factor, as there is no home field advantage in the Super Bowl and both teams are playoff experienced. Since every season 8 of the 11 games are before the Conference chanpionships and Super Bowl, the model works best for those first eight games. Still, it’s always interesting to see what the model calculates.

At least as interesting is the Peyton Manning factor, a player having the second best season of his career (as measured by adjusted yards per attempt). I thought it would be interesting to try and figure out how much of the value above average of the potent Denver Broncos attack that Peyton Manning was responsible for. We’ll start by looking at the simple ranking of the team, divided into the offensive and defensive components. Simple rankings help adapt for the quality of opposition, which for Denver was below league average.

Denver Broncos Simple Ranking Stats
Margin of Victory Strength of Schedule Simple Ranking Defensive Simple Ranking Offensive Simple Ranking
12.47 -1.12 11.35 -3.31 14.65

 

Narrowed down to the essentials, how much of the 14.65 points of Denver offense (above average) was Peyton Manning’s doing? With some pretty simple stats, we can come up with some decent estimates of the Manning contribution to Denver’s value above average.

We’ll start by calculating Peyton’s adjusted yards per attempt, and do so for the league as a whole. We’ll use the Pro Football Reference formula. Later, we’ll use the known conversion factors for AYA to turn that contribution to points, and the subtract the league average from that contribution.

Passing Stats, 2013
Player(s) Completions Attempts Yards Touchdowns Interceptions AYA
Peyton Manning 450 659 5477 55 10 9.3
All NFL passing 11102 18136 120626 804 502 6.3

 

The difference between Peyton Manning’s AYA and the league average is 3 points. Peyton Manning threw 659 times, averaging about 41.2 passes per game. This compares to the average team passing about 35.4 times a game. To convert an AYA into points per 40 passes, the conversion factor is 3.0. This is math people can do in their head. 3 times 3 equals 9 points. In a game situation, in 2013, where Peyton Manning throws 40 passes, he’ll generate 9 points more offense than the average NFL quarterback. So, of the 14.65 points above average that the Denver Broncos generated, Peyton Manning is at least responsible for 61% of that.

Notes:

There is a 0.5 point difference between the AYA reported by Pro Football Reference and the one I calculated for all NFL teams. I suspect PFR came to theirs by taking an average of the AYA of all 32 teams as opposed to calculating the number for all teams. To be sure, we’ll grind the number out step by step.

The yards term: 120626
The TD term: 20 x 804 = 16080
The Int term: 45 x 502 = 22590

120626 + 16080 – 22590 = 114116

Numerator over denominator is:

114116 / 18136 = 6.29223… to two significant digits is 6.3.

I suspect  to a first approximation almost no one other than Baltimore fans, such as Brian Burke, and this blog really believed that Baltimore had much of a chance(+). Well, I should mention Aaron Freeman of Falc Fans, who was rooting for Baltimore but still felt Denver would win. Looking, his article is no longer on the Falcfans site. Pity..

WP graph of Baltimore versus Denver. I tweeted that this graph was going to resemble a seismic chart of an earthquake. Not my work, just a screen shot off the excellent site Advanced NFL Stats.

WP graph of Baltimore versus Denver. I tweeted that this graph was going to resemble a seismic chart of an earthquake. Not my work, just a screen shot off the excellent site Advanced NFL Stats.

After a double overtime victory by 3 points, it’s awfully tempting to say, “I predicted this”, and if you look at the teams I’ve  favored, to this point* the streak of picks is 6-0. Let me point out though, that you can make a limiting assumption and from that assumption figure out how accurate I should have been. The limiting assumption is to assume the playoff model is 100% accurate** and see how well it predicted play. If the model is 100% accurate, the real results and the predicted results should merge.

I can tell you without adding up anything that only one of my favored picks had more than a 70% chance, and at least two were around 52-53%. So 6 times 70 percent is 4.2, and my model, in a perfect world, should have picked no more than 4 winners and 2 losers. A perfect model in a probabilistic world, where teams rarely have 65% chances to win, much less 100%, should be wrong sometimes. Instead, so far it’s on a 6-0 run. That means that luck is driving my success so far.

Is it possible, as I have argued, that strength of schedule is an under appreciated playoff stat, a playoff “Moneyball” stat, that teams that go through tough times are better than their offense and defensive stats suggest? It’s possible at this point. It’s also without question that I’ve been lucky in both the 2012 playoffs and the 2013 playoffs so far.

Potential Championship Scenarios:

 

Conference Championship Possibilities
Home Team Visiting Team Home Win Pct Est. Point Spread
NE BAL 0.523 0.7
HOU BAL 0.383 -3.5
ATL SF 0.306 -6.1
SF SEA 0.745 7.9

 

My model likes Seattle, which has the second best strength of schedule metric of all the playoff teams, but it absolutely loves San Francisco. It also likes Baltimore,  but not enough to say it has a free run throughout the playoffs. Like many modelers, I’m predicting that Atlanta and Seattle will be a close game.

~~~

+ I should also mention  that Bryan  Broaddus tweeted about a colleague of his who predicted a BAL victory.

* Sunday, January 13, 2013, about 10:00am.

** Such a limiting assumption is similar to assuming the NFL draft is rational; that the customers (NFL teams) have all the information they should, that they understand everything about the product they consume  (draft picks), and that their estimates of draft value thus form a normal distribution around the real value of draft picks, and that irrational exuberance, or trends, or GMs falling in love with players play no role in picking players. This, it turns out, makes model simulations much easier.

There were eight trades in the first day involving the first round of the 2012 NFL draft. Most of them involved small shifts in the primary pick, with third day picks added as additional compensation. The one outlying trade was that of the St Louis Rams and the Dallas Cowboys, which involved a substantial shift in  the #1 pick (from 6 to 14) and the secondary compensation was substantial. This high secondary compensation has led to criticism of the trade, most notably by Dan Graziano, whose argument, boiled to its essence, is that Dallas paid a 2 pick price for Morris Claiborne.

Counting  picks is a lousy method to judge trades. After all, Dallas paid a 4 pick price for Tony Dorsett. Was that trade twice as bad a trade as the Morris Claiborne trade?  The Fletcher Cox trade saw Philadelphia give up 3 picks for Fletcher Cox. Was that trade 50% worse than the Morris Claiborne trade?

In order to deal with the issues raised above, I will introduce a new analytic metric for analyzing trade risk, the risk ratio, which is the sum of the AV values of  the picks given, divided by the sum of the AV values of the picks received. For trades with a ratio of 1.0 or less, there is no risk at all. For trades with ratios approaching 2 or so, there is substantial risk. We are now aided in this kind of analysis by Pro Football Reference’s new average AV per draft pick chart. This is a superior tool to their old logarithmic fit, because while the data may be noisy, they avoid systematically overestimating the value of first round picks.

The eight first round trades of 2012, interpreted in terms of AV risk ratios.

The first thing to note about the 8  trades is that the risk ratio of 6 of them is approximately the same. There really is no difference, practically speaking, in the relative risk of the Trent Richardson  trade, or the Morris Claiborne trade,  or the Fletcher Cox trade. Of the two remaining trades, the Justin Blackmon trade was relatively risk free. Jacksonville assumed an extra value burden of 10% for moving up to draft the wide receiver. The other outlier, Harrison Smith, can be explained largely by the noisy data set and an unexpectedly high value of AV for draft pick 98. If you compensate by using 13 instead of 23 for pick #98, you get a risk ratio of approximately 1.48, more in line with the rest of the data sets.

Armed with this information, and picking on Morris Claiborne, how good does he  have to be for this trade to be break even? Well, if his career nets 54 AV, then the trade breaks even. If he has a HOF career (AV > 100), then Dallas wins big. The same applies to Trent Richardson. For the trade to break even, Trent has to net at least 64 AV throughout his career. Figuring out how much AV Doug Martin has to average is a little more complicated, since there were multiple picks on both sides, but Doug would carry his own weight if he gets 21*1.34 ≈ 28 AV.

Four historic trades and their associated risk ratios.

By historic measures, none of the 2012 first round trades were particularly risky. Looking at some trades that have played out in  the past, and one  that is still playing out, the diagram above shows the picks traded for Julio Jones, for Michael Vick, for Tony Dorsett, and also for Earl Campbell.

The Julio Jones trade has yet to play out, but Atlanta, more or less, assumed as much risk (93 AV) as they did for Michael Vick (94 AV), except for a #4 pick and a wide receiver. And although Michael is over 90 AV now, counting AV earned in Atlanta and Philadelphia, he didn’t earn the 90+ AV necessary to balance out the trade while in Atlanta.

Tony Dorsett, with his HOF career, paid off the 96 AV burden created by trading a 1st and three 2nd round choices for the #2 pick. Once again, the risk was high, the burden was considerable, but it gave value to Dallas in the end.

Perhaps the most interesting comparison is the assessment of the Earl Campbell trade. Just by the numbers, it was a bust. Jimmie Giles, the tight end that was part of the trade,  had a long and respectable career with Tampa Bay. That, along with the draft picks, set a bar so high that only the Ray Lewis’s of the world could possibly reach. And while Campbell was a top performer, his period of peak performance was short, perhaps 4   years. That said, I still wonder if Houston would still make the trade, if somehow someone could go back in to the past, with the understanding of what would happen into the relative future. Campbell’s peak was pretty phenomenal, and not entirely encompassed by a mere AV score.

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