The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Dallas DC Dan Quinn spoke recently, and said that the base defense of the Cowboys was going to be more like a 3-4. The actual quote is this:

As far as in the base packages go, it will look more like a 3-4 look, and that would have been consistent whether it was the team last year or my times with Atlanta as well. But more often than not, with most teams, the nickel packages, which teams play, I’d say, close to 60% or 70% of the time are more out of a four-down.

https://twitter.com/therealmarklane?lang=en

Some people have taken this to mean he’s going to a 3-4, and that could not be further from the truth. An examination of the coaching tree of Monte Kiffin should make that pretty clear, and we’ll provide some evidence that in fact the base defense will remain the same as the Marinelli years, even if it’s going to be tweaked a bit.

In the late 1970s Pete Carroll was a defensive assistant at Arkansas, where the head coach was Lou Holtz and his DC was Monte Kiffin. Kiffin was and is a proponent of a 4-3 under defense that he felt could stop the run and also rush the passer. In a coaching clinic recorded on Jerry Campbell Football, the effect Kiffin had on Carroll is marked.

After all the years I’ve been in football I’ve never coached anything but the 4-3 under defense. So I know this defense inside and out. I know the good side of the defense and I know the problems and weaknesses of this defense. I run it with one gap principles but can also make it work with some two gap principles.

https://jcfb.forums.net/thread/14894/the-4-3-under

So Dan Quinn is on the Kiffin tree as so. Kiffin -> Carroll -> Quinn. Marinelli is on the same tree, serving as a line coach with the Buccaneers when Kiffin was their defensive coordinator. More recently, Marinelli has been a line coach and defensive coordinator with various assignments with the Cowboys, and Marinelli’s 4-3 is what they are most familiar with.

So, some simple conclusions. The base of the C owboys base is the 4-3 under that the Cowboys have played for years, and the base is likely to be a version of the 4-3 under tweaked to have some two gapping added to the front.

But is it? Dan Quinn is known for tweaking his fronts to put his best players on the field, and he will find his best 7 over time. There are two fieldgulls.com articles (here and here) which show that he tries things in order to get best fits. The latter article talks about the successful adaptation of Red Bryant to becoming a two gap defensive end, but also that DQ that year was going to let Red Bryant 1 gap some.

Bryant said he’ll return to being more of a penetrating, one-gap defensive end and playing mostly over the right tackle.

https://www.fieldgulls.com/football-breakdowns/2013/5/31/4382318/the-seahawks-and-the-4-3-under-front-winds-of-change

Dan Quinn doesn’t let fronts get etched in stone. He crafts them.

There is a great article in Sports Illustrated that gives us some language to use for the component parts of a Seattle Hybrid defense. If the front from the defenses POV and from left to right is 4i-1-3-9, then the position names are BIG END, NOSE, 3T and LEO. In the hybrid, the BIG END is a two gap player, but because it shares so many component parts with the 4-3 under one gap, it does not have to be. Letting a BIG END 1 gap is pretty simple. The Mike linebacker just has to cover the strong side B gap. Let’s let Pete describe the left over gap assigments in the 4-3 under one gap.

The front five players I mentioned are playing aggressive defense with their outside arms free. The only thing we can’t allow to happen is for them to get hooked or reached by the defender. This alignment leaves open the strong side B Gap and the weak side A gap which are played by the Mike and Will linebackers.

https://jcfb.forums.net/thread/14894/the-4-3-under

A lot of this exercise is to eliminate any nonsense that suggests Dallas is going to a base 3-4 and DeMarcus Lawrence will have to be an OLB. He doesn’t have to be anything but DeMarcus, and he has a proven ability to defend the run as a one gapping defensive end. For that matter he might be able to two gap as well, though the addition in free agency of guys like Urban and drafting men like Osa Odighizuwa suggest perhaps a rotation at BIG END.

More importantly to me, most of the new defense should seem familiar to the veteran players. Going from a 4-3 under one gap to a hybrid isn’t a huge shift. DQ will have an off season to install, which the unfortunate Mike Nolan did not. The biggest shift is in the players the new regime likes, what physical traits they emphasize.

 

Playoffs Conference Round, 2020 Season

Ok, I have not been posting my playoff formulas, and for good reason, as there is no home field advantage this time around. That and the insane politics of the US transition have made it easy to focus on other things.

Looking purely at offensive stats (not the best predictors) from this source Tampa Bay should be slightly favored over Green Bay, so long as the weather is decent. Bad weather would give Green Bay an edge. The same is true for Buffalo; it should be slightly favored just looking at simple rankings or Pythagoreans. In the case of Tampa Bay, the delta is less than 2 points. For Buffalo, less than a point.

The other side of the coin is that both Green Bay and Kansas City outperformed their Pythagoreans, GB by a bit, KC by a lot. Though in KC’s case, Patrick Mahomes has to pass a concussion protocol before he would be allowed to play.

We’ll see. Stats suggest close games in any case. In terms of a good analytics take on the games, try this article from fivethirtyeight.com.

 

Tampa 2 and Cover 2 links: a survey.

I haven’t done many Xs and Os articles recently, and this one isn’t going to be explanatory in and of itself. Instead, its going to be a set of links pointing to Tampa 2 and Cover 2 resources. I’d like this to be a living document, at least over the short term, which means I reserve the right to rewrite, amend, and add to this list. If you are a coach or interested amateur, feel free to let me know more sources and resources that I can add.

What you’ll see here in order is a link, perhaps a short summary of the scope of the link, and perhaps a short quote from the link. I might borrow a diagram or two from the link, if I think it will help the reader.

Obviously this is driven by the hire of Monte Kiffen and Rod Marinelli by the Dallas Cowboys. Rob Ryan was fired recently. The reasons are part of still heated discussions, but given subsequent hires, it’s easy enough to suggest that the powers that be among the Cowboys want better execution all round. That the Cowboys offense was more prone to penalties and miscues than the defense is a position many Cowboys fans take, and that faction treats the firing of Ron Ryan as a kind of scapegoating.

Whether true or false, we’re just trying to gather under one roof, resources on this defense, notes useful to fans and coaches alike.

Before beginning, we’ll mention some things that should be any any defense aficionado’s bag of tricks: the multipart articles on defense by Jene Bramel, a copy of the Jaworksi, Cosell and Plaut book, and of course, Tim Layden’s quality introduction to modern football concepts. If you have never seen the Smart Football blog, you should, and if you’re looking for information on stunts and modern zone blitzes, the Blitzology blog seldom disappoints.

A variety of other Xs and Os links are on the sidebar.

Football Times on the Tampa 2

Scope: introductory. Diagrams may not be accurate, as they display an even front.

From Football Times article. Yellow regions are holes in the zone of a stock cover 2. Tampa 2 lets MLB drop deeper, covering middle yellow, and allowing safeties to move zone coverage closer to end lines, helping close intermediate gaps.

Inside the Playbook on the Tampa 2

Scope: Introductory. Matt Bowen was a NFL defensive back, and knows coverages well.

Matt’s diagram of a Tampa 2 coverage, 4-3 over, with a stunt on the strong side.

Wikipedia on the Tampa 2

Scope: introductory. Article is self contradictory on the history of the defense.

The personnel used in the Tampa 2 are specific in position and required abilities. All positions in this defense place a premium on speed, and often the result is that they are all undersized by league standards. The defensive linemen in this scheme have to be quick and agile enough to create pressure on the quarterback without the aid of a blitz from either the linebackers or the secondary, with
the defensive tackle in the nose position having above-average tackling skills to help stop runs.

The Fifth Down Blog on the Cover 2 and Tampa 2

Scope: Introductory. Jene Bramel’s coverage of the Monte Kiffin system.

Daily Norsemen on Minnesota’s Tampa 2

Scope: nicely done introductory level discussion of the back 7 responsibilities in the Tampa 2

While they will generally all be tailored to one gap attacking from the 4-3 front … the back seven will have to display a wide variety of skills in order to execute the full defense.

This is distinct from some 3-4 systems (and other 4-3s), where the varied looks and confusing schemes imply a high degree of
flexibility from all players, but in fact does not require as much individual diversity at key positions.

ESPN News Article: fewer and fewer Cover 2 teams

Scope: news article, reporting teams moving away from Cover 2 because safeties can’t hit as hard anymore.

The Core Positions in the Tampa 2

Scope: Introductory, newspaper blog. Bears-centric. Reporter repeating what a coach has told him.

Stampede Blue on the NT position in the Tampa 2

Scope: Introductory, with emphasis on the Colts and their history with 1 technique DTs in the Tampa 2.

Bryan Broaddus on the Tampa 2

Scope: Introduction. Some discussion of where current Cowboys fit into a Tampa 2 style scheme. Historically accurate.

In terms of the Tampa Bay personnel compared to this current Cowboys squad, think of DeMarcus Ware as Simeon Rice, Bruce Carter
as Derrick Brooks, Sean Lee as Shelton Quarles and Barry Church as John Lynch, with Jay Ratliff as Warren Sapp. I don’t believe
the coverage part will be a problem for Carr and Claiborne, but how physical they can be trying to do those things I spoke of
in funneling runs inside or playing the run when he gets to the outside will be important.

How to coach the MLB drop in Tampa 2

Scope: coaching thread on message board.

That middle position isn’t manned by the true MLB type that the Miami 4-3 was predicated on. Like these guys have said, he’s 6 yards back and has different responsibilities too.

Pass Coverage in the Tampa 2

Scope: Coaching blog, and article. MLB, CB, and S responsibilities.

General coaching thread on the Tampa 2.

It is not a viable every-down coverage, due to the fact that you basically are giving up the entire 0-10 yd zone from hash-to-hash without resistance, so if a team just hits the TE & RB’s over the middle, they can kill you with 8 yd gains every snap.

Tampa 2 versus the spread

I was surprised when I found out that The Tampa 2 wasn’t the same thing as the 4-3 Over Cover 2. Went to a COY clinic in Orlando a few years ago and Monte Kiffen was the speaker. It looked more like a version of the WT-6(*) than a version of the 4-3 Over. I’m still not real sure about that thing.

Not Tampa 2 specific, but interesting in contrast

On Pete Carroll’s Seahawks 4-3

Scope: Introductory to intermediate.

Shakin’ the Southland on the Miami 4-3 and descendents.

Scope: Intermediate.

Offensive Football, busting the Cover 2

Shakin’ The Southland  (Clemson football blog) on the Cover 2.

Scope: intermediate, with plenty of video.

Almost any article by Chris Brown of Smart Football has football coaches as its primary audience. Advanced fans can glean some insight as well.

Chris Brown on Peyton Manning’s favorite play: Levels

Delayed Slant from the  Smash

Beating Cover 2 from Trips.

~~~
* presumably, wide tackle 6.

We got the Split-60 from Coach “Erk Russell” in 1984. It was the WT-6 on the Strongside and the Split-4 on the Weakside. They called it the “Junk Yard Dog” defense. Coach Russell said that it took the best of the WT-6 and the Split-4.

We got it, squeezed down the Strongside into a 50 that we were more used to and I’ve used it every since as a Gap 5-2. Wish I’d put it in print, but I was just a coaching pup then and just thought it wasn’t anything special.

Now they call it the 4-3 Under and say that Monte Kiffen is credited with it. Same defense that Coach Russell ran at Georgia with a few little wrinkles. I guess some things never change.

 

Assessing the break even point of NFL draft trades

There were eight trades in the first day involving the first round of the 2012 NFL draft. Most of them involved small shifts in the primary pick, with third day picks added as additional compensation. The one outlying trade was that of the St Louis Rams and the Dallas Cowboys, which involved a substantial shift in  the #1 pick (from 6 to 14) and the secondary compensation was substantial. This high secondary compensation has led to criticism of the trade, most notably by Dan Graziano, whose argument, boiled to its essence, is that Dallas paid a 2 pick price for Morris Claiborne.

Counting  picks is a lousy method to judge trades. After all, Dallas paid a 4 pick price for Tony Dorsett. Was that trade twice as bad a trade as the Morris Claiborne trade?  The Fletcher Cox trade saw Philadelphia give up 3 picks for Fletcher Cox. Was that trade 50% worse than the Morris Claiborne trade?

In order to deal with the issues raised above, I will introduce a new analytic metric for analyzing trade risk, the risk ratio, which is the sum of the AV values of  the picks given, divided by the sum of the AV values of the picks received. For trades with a ratio of 1.0 or less, there is no risk at all. For trades with ratios approaching 2 or so, there is substantial risk. We are now aided in this kind of analysis by Pro Football Reference’s new average AV per draft pick chart. This is a superior tool to their old logarithmic fit, because while the data may be noisy, they avoid systematically overestimating the value of first round picks.

The eight first round trades of 2012, interpreted in terms of AV risk ratios.

The first thing to note about the 8  trades is that the risk ratio of 6 of them is approximately the same. There really is no difference, practically speaking, in the relative risk of the Trent Richardson  trade, or the Morris Claiborne trade,  or the Fletcher Cox trade. Of the two remaining trades, the Justin Blackmon trade was relatively risk free. Jacksonville assumed an extra value burden of 10% for moving up to draft the wide receiver. The other outlier, Harrison Smith, can be explained largely by the noisy data set and an unexpectedly high value of AV for draft pick 98. If you compensate by using 13 instead of 23 for pick #98, you get a risk ratio of approximately 1.48, more in line with the rest of the data sets.

Armed with this information, and picking on Morris Claiborne, how good does he  have to be for this trade to be break even? Well, if his career nets 54 AV, then the trade breaks even. If he has a HOF career (AV > 100), then Dallas wins big. The same applies to Trent Richardson. For the trade to break even, Trent has to net at least 64 AV throughout his career. Figuring out how much AV Doug Martin has to average is a little more complicated, since there were multiple picks on both sides, but Doug would carry his own weight if he gets 21*1.34 ≈ 28 AV.

Four historic trades and their associated risk ratios.

By historic measures, none of the 2012 first round trades were particularly risky. Looking at some trades that have played out in  the past, and one  that is still playing out, the diagram above shows the picks traded for Julio Jones, for Michael Vick, for Tony Dorsett, and also for Earl Campbell.

The Julio Jones trade has yet to play out, but Atlanta, more or less, assumed as much risk (93 AV) as they did for Michael Vick (94 AV), except for a #4 pick and a wide receiver. And although Michael is over 90 AV now, counting AV earned in Atlanta and Philadelphia, he didn’t earn the 90+ AV necessary to balance out the trade while in Atlanta.

Tony Dorsett, with his HOF career, paid off the 96 AV burden created by trading a 1st and three 2nd round choices for the #2 pick. Once again, the risk was high, the burden was considerable, but it gave value to Dallas in the end.

Perhaps the most interesting comparison is the assessment of the Earl Campbell trade. Just by the numbers, it was a bust. Jimmie Giles, the tight end that was part of the trade,  had a long and respectable career with Tampa Bay. That, along with the draft picks, set a bar so high that only the Ray Lewis’s of the world could possibly reach. And while Campbell was a top performer, his period of peak performance was short, perhaps 4   years. That said, I still wonder if Houston would still make the trade, if somehow someone could go back in to the past, with the understanding of what would happen into the relative future. Campbell’s peak was pretty phenomenal, and not entirely encompassed by a mere AV score.